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MONOPOLY PROFITS, ECONOMIC IMPOSSIBILITY, AND
UNFAIRNESS AS ANTI-TRUST TESTS
PHILIP MARCUS*

Judge Wyzanski, one of our more perceptive judges, recently had
occasion to make some observations of far reaching significance with
respect to the antitrust laws and our economic system. By taking
certain action he may have expressed also a philosophy as important
as that to which he gave words, a philosophy which seems to have
been accepted also by the first circuit which has affirmed Judge
Wyzanski's action, with one modification. The setting for Judge
Wyzanski's commentary was Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of
New England, Inc.,' in which the complaint charged violation of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 2 and of section 7 of the Clayton
Act.3 To this one of the defendants counterclaimed with charges
of violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. This article
deals with the case in terms of three problems central to the determination of this dispute: the use of monopoly profits, economic impossibility, and unfairness.

I. THE FAcTUAL SITUAT ON
Prior to the events which culminated in this suit, the city of
Haverhill, Massachusetts boasted a single newspaper, the Haverhill
Gazette. In 1957, the Gazette's prosperity was disturbed by a strike
of certain of its printers. While it was not forced to suspend publication, its circulation fell by about fifty per cent. Some Haverhill
merchants, responding either to conviction or to pressure, then induced the publisher of the sole newspaper in Manchester, New
Hampshire, to open a newspaper in Haverhill. Soon Haverhill had
the Haverhill Journal as well as the Gazette.
One can hardly read Judge Wyzanski's statement of the facts without concluding that the newcomer was an unfair and heavy-handed
competitor. Less blameworthy, but not without blemish, were the
* Antitrust Div., Dept. of Justice. The views expressed in this article are
those of the writer and do not necessarily represent those of any government
agency.
1. 180 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1960), aff'd as modified, 284 F.2d 582 (1st
Cir. 1960). A comment on the district court decision appears in 73 HARv. L.
REv.1632 (1960).
2. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958).
3. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958). Neither court
found any Clayton Act violation, and this article deals principally with
the alleged violations of the Sherman Act. The Clayton Act problems are
discussed at some length in the first circuit opinion of Judge Aldrich. 184
F.2d at 588-91.
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retaliatory efforts of the Gazette. After a short time, the publisher
of the Journaltried, without success, to purchase the Gazette. Other
New England publishers watched this internecine struggle with
growing concern. These publishers, motivated either by a desire for
commercial investment or by fear that they might be the next to
experience the Gazette's plight, or by both, formed a corporation to
which the stockholders of the Gazette preferred to sell out rather than
to the publisher of the Journal. Shortly after this sale was made, the
publisher of the Journalfiled this suit.
For the purposes of this discussion, the findings of the court can
be roughly stated as follows: (1) The use of monopoly profits, both
in the establishment of the Journal and in the formation of the
publishers association, to enter the Haverhill newspaper market was
not a violation if done for a legitimate purpose, not "primarily to
cause loss of business to another." (2) The Haverhill market could
not support two high grade dailies, so that a natural monopoly
situation existed. (3) Therefore, the use of unfair methods, such
as advertising rate discrimination, also establishes the existence of
an exclusionary intent.
II. THE USE OF MONOPOLY PROFITS AND MONOPOLY POWER
The first major question in the case, as the district court stated it,
was whether the Union Leader Corporation (publisher of the Journal)
"was free to use in the second market the profits it had made in the
monopoly market .... ',4 The court answered this by stating a general
principle: "[O]ne who enjoys a lawful monopoly in one market is
free to enter another market but is prohibited from using in that
other market what is technically called the 'market power' he enjoys
in the first market."5 The court did not feel that in general Union
Leader was making such use of its Manchester market power. There
was no proof of combination advertising contracts for the Manchester
paper and the Journal,and while the two were printed in the same
plant, it was not shown that the Journal thereby obtained any substantial economic advantage.6
The same principle applied, in the court's view, in the case of the
use of profits derived from newspaper monopolies in other cities by
the members of the association which purchased the Gazette. As
Judge Wyzanski phrased it:
4. 180 F. Supp. at 139.
5. Ibid.

6. Thus the problem of the joint venture was obviated. For an interesting

discussion of joint ventures, see Bork, AncilZary Restraints and the Sherman
Act, 15 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 211, 224 (1959).
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Here there is no evidence of interlacing of policies, practices or operations of . . . [the association's] stockholders inter se or with . . . [the
Gazette]. Each runs a wholly separate enterprise. Each is king in its
own city. None has joined an imperial federation holding sway in New
7
England.
In summary, the court's attitude on the use of monopoly profits is
best indicated by its use of a passage from the Restatement of Torts:
[Olne who ... owns the only newspaper (that is, a so-called monopoly
newspaper) in a city is not merely on that account prohibited from
using its funds to start a newspaper in another city where there is
competition. If all that is involved is the use of money, and if the
money is invested with relation to a reasonable expectation of ultimate
profit, or, let us say, to promote some political end, or to accomplish some
other legitimate purpose and not "primarily for the purpose of causing
loss of business to another" (Restatement, Torts § 709), the investment
is not a tort and ordinarily is not a restraint of trade nor an attempt to
monopolize.0
The quoted statements raise some arresting problems. It is not entirely clear from the opinion whether the court was making a distinction between the case where one was using primarily monopoly
profits to put someone out of business, and the situation where one
was using moneys not so derived but for the same purpose primarily. If this is the distinction that is being drawn, the source of
the means to achieve a purpose becomes more important than the
purpose. If not, the reference to monopoly profits with respect to
causing someone a loss rather than with respect to achieving another
monopoly seems a fertile source of confusion.
Whatever the precise implications of the statement, surely Judge
Wyzanski is not stating that the source of funds used to achieve a
monopoly by putting a competitor out of business is irrelevant to the
decision. Would the situation be the same where the owner of the
sole newspaper in one city does this in another city as where this
is done by one whose newspaper voice is already the sole voice in a
much larger part of the same region, although not in the identical
area? Would it be all right for one to open a newspaper in a few,
in many, in all New England cities with the intent that his newspaper
succeed and the existing one fail and that ultimately he be the newspaper lord of all he surveys, but gained "without unfair means"? To
7. 180 F. Supp. at 144.
8. 180 F. Supp. at 139. Judge Aldrich's opinion for the first circuit explicitly approves this holding: 'We agree with the [district] court that the
use of financial resources alone was not such an exercise of the Manchester
!monopoly power' in Haverhill as would imply an intent by Union Leader
wrongfully to exclude its competitor." 284 F.2d at 584 n. 5. See also the
later statement: 'But we have never heard of a principle that a corporation
having affluent shareholders could not compete." 284 F.2d at 589. The source
of the affluence is notably not mentioned.
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bring a section 2 case under such circumstances, must one wait until
the monopoly stage has been reached?
It would seem inadvisable to lay down any general rule as to the
use of profits from one monopoly to attain another. At some point,
certainly, consideration might be given as to whether other buyers
are available. The courts in dicta and the pundits in statements as
to the law have taken the position that there may be reasonable
monopolies, such as where monopoly power is the result of natural
circumstances, thrust upon one or earned by one's honest sweat.9
But the validity of a monopoly may be judged by what it does after
creation as well as by how it was created. And, since it is the corruptibility of monopoly power that presents an ever-present and well
recognized problem, one's use of the fruits of that monopoly power
to gain another monopoly may well merit a stricter test than in the
case of one who must operate without such power. Where monopolies
are in the same field, it would seem unlikely that the absence of
geographical identity would prevent the market position of the owner
from being enhanced in each area as a buyer, seller, or employer because he has more than one monopoly. 10
The circuit court opinion seems to have recognized these implications, although it fails to specifically apply them to the relationship
between monopoly profits and monopoly power. It speaks in terms
of the concept of the "wider market":
We cannot agree with the district court that there could be no proscribed
activity here because there was nothing but a number of narrow markets
in each of which a shareholder [in the association] was "king" and
hence no "combined . . . market power." . . . On the contrary, in

whatever measure any shareholder was concerned in protecting its own

narrow market, it was aided by others similarly situated. To this
degree we see a wider market and the possibility of an illegal transaction.11

In the final analysis, however, the circuit court did not feel that the
evidence in the case was strong enough to compel it to disagree with
the district court finding that none of the participants in the purchase
of the Gazette had sufficiently increased its market position to find a

violation.12
The use of one's monopoly power to secure-or attempt to secureanother monopoly or dominant position is surely not highly regarded

9. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D.
Mass. 1953), af'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); cf. United States v. DuPont & Co., 351
U. S. 377, 390-91 (1956). See also A-romiuy GENErAl's Com
EvrrEE
To STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT

56

(1955).

10. It may be noted that in the instant case, Haverhill and Manchester

are but a short distance apart.
11. 284 F.2d at 589.
12. 284 F.2d at 590.
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in antitrust law.'3 Nor does a monopolist enjoy the same freedom of
economic action that the non-monopolist may enjoy. 14 It would seem
unsafe to assume that the "honest" monopolist would be allowed to
secure any appreciable number of other similar monopolies before
the courts would cry "Halt!"' 5 The law may be ready to bar or
refuse reinforcement of such use of monopoly power even without
cases
finding an antitrust violation; to be followed later-as in patent
16
-with a substantial coalescence with the antitrust laws.
Since newspaper monopolies are the rule rather than the exception,
it would hardly do to say that no newspaper monopolist could acquire
another newspaper monopoly elsewhere. But what might be "reasonable" so far as the public interest is concerned in the case of one
such monopolist might be unreasonable in the case of another, even
in the absence of any "unfair" tactics.' 7 This is a type of situation,
however, which, if it is to be dealt with under the antitrust laws,
should be applied through the process of a civil suit and not through
8
a criminal action.'
13. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 459 (1940); F. C.
Russell Co. v. Comfort Equip. Corp., 194 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1952); BaldwinLima Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Sys. Co., 268 F.2d 395 (3d Cir.
1959); cert. denied, 361 U.S. 894 (1959).
14. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Hershey Chocolate Corp. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1941); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit
& Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817
(1952); United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D.
Minn. 1945); Greenleaf v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 79 F. Supp. 362
(D. Pa. 1947); Tallahassee Oil & Fertilizer Co. v. H. S. & J. L. Holloway, 200
Ala. 492, 76 So. 434 (1917); Dunkel v. McDonald, 57 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. et.
1945) aff'd in part, 270 N.Y. App. Div. 757, 59 N.Y.S.2d 921 (1946); James v.
Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 737, 155 P.2d 329, 335, 338 (1944); Wilson
v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N.J. Eq. 347, 350-51, 197 Atl.
720, 722 (1938). See Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600
(1936). Cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
15. The fewer the entrepreneurs in a field, the more likely an augmentation of their geographic area of competition with other competitors. Under
section 7 of the Clayton Act, a tendency toward or a creation of an oligopoly
situation is a relevant consideration, even though the oligopoly situation
may be legal. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 607
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v. Brown Shoe Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1 69,532
(D. Mo. 1959); S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950). See Barnes,
Markets, Competition, and Monopolistic Tendencies in Merger Cases, 40
MARQ. L. REV. 141, 148 (1956). Compare the comment of Judge Barnes,
head of the Antitrust Division, with respect to the RCA case: "That raises
the question .... whether a monopoly of monopolies can exist." Hearings
Before Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 180 (Feb. 25, 1955). The RCA case was settled.
16. See Marcus, Patents, Antitrust Laws and Antitrust Judgments Through
Hartford-Empire,34 GEO. L. J. 1, 25 (1945).
17. Significant differences might be in size of the monopolists, extent of
their power, location of other newspapers which are part of the monopoly,
attempts at, or possibility of, selling to a non-monopolist, etc. A court may
regard one monopoly less favorably than another. Clairborne Elec. Co-op,
Inc. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 155 F. Supp. 644 (D. La. 1957).
18. Even where unfair tactics have been used by one to attain a newspaper
monopoly, the government may have a difficult choice in deciding whether
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Having raised these questions in regard to the use of monopoly
profits in general, it seems appropriate to inquire whether there
should be any difference in the law's treatment where the profits so
used come from an illegal monopoly. It is arguable that the legality
of what one does with money is not to be judged by the legality of
its source. Thus, antitrust judgments almost uniformly are barren
of any attempt to reach monopoly profits. 19 On the other hand, the
Supreme Court has admonished against leaving the fruits of a
monopolistic conspiracy untouched. 20 In antitrust cases, moreover,
the courts have shown little concern with loss of future profits.2' The
law contains many instances where the taint which attaches to something illegally obtained carries over to a subsequent transaction
to bring a civil or criminal case, if it is confronted with a one-newspaper
city. A criminal suit, if won, is likely to result in a fine which the defendant
may regard as a cheap price to pay for a monopoly. It is also more
difficult to win than a civil suit. See United States v. Hart-Hanks Newspapers, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 227 (N.D. Tex. 1959). To gain divestiture in a
civil suit, the government may have to argue a "fruits of monopoly" theory
or restoration of the status quo (rather than as in the ordinary case, restoration of competition) against a defendant's contention of "penalty." Query, if
divestiture is secured whether the defendant could later use "fair" means
to acquire it.
19. But cf. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 324 U.S. 570, 571-72, 580
(1945) wherein ultimately, the lessee recovered part of the royalties paid
in to the receiver. On the other hand, the writer knows of no case where
a defendant required to divest some property was able to insist upon receiving its value as part of a monopoly situation where the monopoly had
been or was being dissipated and its market value reflected that fact. In
some instances, where defendants have delayed obeying a court order for
divestiture, court orders granting additional time have been conditioned
upon a loss of the right to receive full market value. Antitrust judgments
have been entered barring recovery for past violations of patent rights where
the patents were involved in antitrust violations. And the courts have left
the misused patent holder holding a bag of unredressible "wrongs" which
have hurt his pocketbook. Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488
(1942); B. B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942); Mercoid Corp. v. Honeywell Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
Of course, the indirect effect of many antitrust judgments will destroy
or dissipate monopoly profits which have been reinvested in an enterprise
which is the subject of the judgment. Most of the cases cited in the succeeding footnotes have this element. The law expressly provides for forfeiture in certain types of antitrust situations. 26 Stat. 210 (1890), 15 U.S.C.
§ 6 (1958).
20. Schine Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128 (1948).
21. E.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 156 (1922); United
States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944); United States
v. Schine Theatres, 334 U.S. 110, (1948); International Boxing Club v.
United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959); and see In re Consolidated Elec. & Gas
Co., 55 F. Supp. 211, 216 (D. Del. 1944). But cf. United States v. E. I.
DuPont de Nemours and Co., 177 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1959), now on appeal
in the Supreme Court.
Such loss will almost always follow termination of tie-in arrangements.
Royalty fee licensing provisions in judgments, as well as those providing
for compulsory licensing at reasonable royalties, may have an adverse
effect on the profit picture. Divestiture decrees will generally have a
similar effect. As to dividends, see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 79-80 (1911); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S. 61, 96-97
(1912).
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involving that thing.22 There is a practical difficulty in taking away
and knowing what to do with moneys improperly secured through
antitrust violations-private treble damage suits and fines notwithstanding-but such difficulties do not obtain where the moneys have
been used to achieve a monopoly which can be more readily dissipated
without appreciable loss to the antitrust violator.
III. EcoNozmc ImPossiniLITY-THE OFFERs To PuRcaAsE

The second key finding of the court with which we are concerned

was that the Haverhill market could not support two high grade
dailies. The court noted the city's population of 47,000, and the
combined circulation of the papers, which was 20,000, and on the
basis of these figures and expert opinion stated that it was "possible
to run at a profit in Haverhill two or more daily newspapers of
limited coverage and of inferior general quality" but that a newspaper of the high standards of either the Journal or the Gazette
"could not succeed financially as a wholly independent enterprise
unless either it had no rivals or had in the face of rivalry a circulation of over 15,000."23 Judge Wyzanski also found that both papers
had been operating for some time at a loss.24
With this background, the court approached the problem of the
offer of the Journal to buy out the Gazette, stating:
If this were a city in which at least two newspapers could economically
survive, the offer to purchase would be an attempt to monopolize ...
It would not be a victory won by skill, foresight, and industry. But the
situation is different where a city can accomodate only one successful
newspaper, and two roughly equally able companies are competing for
the single prize that is available.25
22. E.g., Diedrich v. Northwestern Union Ry., 42 Wis. 248 (1877); Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Hubbard, 363 Ill. 99, 1 N.E.2d 383
(1936); Kingsland v. Mayor, 110 N.Y. 569, 18 N.E. 435 (1888); Joly v. City
of Salem, 276 Mass. 297, 177 N.E. 121 (1931) (enhanced value from illegal
use not compensable).
23., 180 F. Supp. at 129. The conclusion is accepted by the circuit court
with little comment. 284 F.2d at 583-84.
24. 180 F. Supp. at 129.
25. 180 F. Supp. at 142. Seemingly, the court makes a distinction between the
situation where one comes into an area with the intent to put someone else out
of business, but not to remain there oneself, and the situation where one comes
in with the intent to put someone out of business in order to remain there.
Actually, it would seem that it is the first of these situations where the intent
or attempt to monopolize is the more difficult to ascertain.
In determining whether there is an attempt to monopolize, is there a distinction between action designed to eliminate the competition of another by
forcing him to abandon his business and thus gain a monopoly, and action
designed to eliminate a competitor by buying him out and thus to achieve -a
monopoly? It stretches one's imagination to believe that when the plaintiff
tried to buy the Gazette, it had any idea that, if successful, it would operate
both the Journal and the Gazette.
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Therefore, since in the court's view survival of but one paper was
inevitable, it would have been permissible for the Journal to have
paid a reasonable price for the Gazette, since "though it would have
appeared to lessen competition it would have not done so substanshortened the time within
tially; it merely would have somewhat
26
continue."
could
which competition
By applying much the same reasoning, the circuit court found
that the association which incorporated and purchased the Gazette
had not violated section 7 of the Clayton Act which makes certain
stock acquisitions illegal if the effect would be to substantially lessen
competition. Said Judge Aldrich: "If competition is doomed by
27
market conditions, it cannot be 'lessened' by a change of ownership."
The writer finds much that is disturbing in the foregoing analysis.
It is particularly difficult to accept Judge Wyzanski's analysis of
the attempt to purchase in isolation from the rest of the case. The
judge had found a number of activities of the plaintiff designed to
bring the Gazette to its knees to be attempts to monopolize. It is in
the context of such illegal activities that the validity of the attempted
purchase might have been-and, it is submitted, should have beenadjudged.2
Is a sale to be condoned even though compelled by illegal activities
of one competitor because the area has not enough economic room
for two competitors? Could not the purchase be held illegal because
the Gazette was entitled to have its success or failure determined by
economic forces other than those tainted with "unfairness"? It is not
believed that because one of the two competitors must sell out the
law can be unconcerned with how the predisposition of one of them
to sell is brought about. The courts should be concerned with the
effect of the means used as well as with the means themselves.
be
A number of other questions suggest themselves. Can the court
29
sure it is not economically feasible for two such newspapers to
survive in Haverhill, even on the basis of expert testimony? Is that a
proper inquiry for the court? Should a judge become involved in
26. Ibid.
27. 284 F.2d at 489.
28. For illustrations of this type of reasoning, see Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S.
436, 461 (1940); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707
(1944); Ballard Oil Terminal Corp. v. Mexican Petroleum Corporation, 28
F.2d 91 (1st Cir. 1928); United States v. Logan Co., 130 F. Supp. 550 (W.D.
Pa. 1954).
29. As has been noted, the court at one point in its opinion uses the term
"wholly" independent to describe the papers. The writer assumes that the
court means that neither newspaper would be operationally connected with
other newspapers. If it means not having outside support, this does not
seem relevant. The resources of a wealthy owner may be as strong a prop
as those of a third party.
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the kind of absolute prophecies and determinations which to the

writer appear in Judge Wyzanski's findings? Moreover, is it more
important to the people of Haverhill that there be only one paper of
the "quality" of the Gazette or Journal, rather than two papers of
perhaps "lesser" quality, but with some divergence of news coverage,
news emphasis, and editorial viewpoint? Does "quality" mean such
things as the size of its comic strip, affiliation with more than one
news association, national columnists, the type face used? Is it quality
of content, or is it perhaps quality of style to which the court refers?
Is economic feasibility a relevant test in this connection? The fact
of survival and the ability to survive should be more relevant considerations even though economic feasibility "proves" they cannot
exist.30 After all, even though few localities can boast of more than
one daily, there are at least some such areas exclusive of large metropolitan centers.3 1
The Sherman Act does not guarantee business success to anyone.
It does guarantee the right of a person to enter into or carry on a
commercial endeavor free from artificial restraints, even though it is
widely believed that he is a fool to engage in such endeavor. And,
sometimes, the "fool" is successful. The exercise of the free forces
of competition is supposed to determine whether one, two, or three
of which one of two or three establishments will succeed; this is not
purely a task for expert opinion. This writer is continually amazed
how myriads of dry cleaning shops clustered in a particular area
survive. Some do not. But many do even though I, in my "expert
omniscience," am certain that they cannot. The same is true of some
of the weekly newspapers in the county where I live which have
survived for more than ten years. In the Union Leader case, the
court, in commenting on the questions of intent of the defendants in
acquiring the Gazette, said as to the latter; "[I]f it secured new funds
and new management and if it was not faced with unfair competition
it was of December 1958 reasonable to believe that within a year...
[the Gazette] would reach a break-even point and that ultimately it
would regain its earlier profitability." 32 Unless the court meant that
within a year the Journalwould be out of business, it would seem that
this is a recognition or an intimation that a newspaper could operate
in this competitive atmosphere without losing money. There is at
least an intimation in the district court's findings that, expert opinion
30. Thus in Scott Publishing Co. v. Columbia Basin Publishers, Inc., 180
F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Wash. 1959), it appeared that two newspapers in the
situation of those in Haverhill had existed for some ten years.
31. The writer understands that in Sarasota, Florida, since 1954 there
have been three newspapers, two of which have been in single ownership.
They are now involved in antitrust litigation.
32. 180 F. Supp. at 138.
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to the contrary notwithstanding, there were third parties interested
in purchasing the Gazette despite the competitive battle in which it
was engaged. 33
Is it not possible that a person with other profitable financial interests might be found willing to operate a newspaper with little or
no profit, or even with a slight loss, either because he is able to
indulge himself by doing what many of us would like to do-run a
newspaper-or because of some benefit he or his other business enterprises would receive from such an operation? 34 Moreover, a new
factory, government installation, or shopping center for Haverhill
might change the economic situation substantially and rapidly.
It may be doubted that at the time the Journal sought to buy the
Gazette, the experts who testified before the court would have thought
it likely that any third party would be interested in buying the
Gazette. But that is exactly what happened. The purchase, indeed,
saved the dual newspaper service for Haverhill, for one would surely
have to stretch his imagination to believe that when the plaintiff
tried to buy the Gazette it had any idea that, if successful, it would
operate both the Journal and the Gazette.
Does not the court have an obligation to preserve temporary competition as well as "permanent" competition? If it were known that
at the end of three years a commodity would be supplanted by another commodity, would an attempt to monopolize the first commodity
at the beginning of the period be permissible? Is it, in any event,
a proper inquiry of a court to attempt to determine how long a
competitor can exist and on the basis determine whether to find an
attempt to monopolize? The Sherman Act applies to "any part" of
our commerce.35 It applies to protect a newly organized business. 36

And it applies to condemn a monopolization which is temporary as
well as one which is permanent. 37
33. 180 F. Supp. at 134.
34. Thus, in Scott Publishing Co. v. Columbia Basin Publishers, Inc., supra
note 30, it appeared that the International Typographical Union, through a
corporation known as Unitypo, Inc., had, on a number of occasions where a
newspaper had been unwilling to come to terms with the union, created a
competitive newspaper. In the instant case, one of the reasons for
defendants' purchase of the Gazette may well have been to use it as a
training ground for some of their employees. 180 F. Supp. at 135, 138.
35. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911); Farmer's Guide
Co. v. Prairie Co., 293 U.S. 268, 279 (1934); United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., 332 U.S. 218, 226 (1947).
36. Forgett v. Scharf, 181 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
825 (1951).
37. Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1939) (corner on July corn). In
that case the court said: "'Any part' of commerce may cover commerce in
a vast district, or that in a small district, that occurring over a long period
of time or over a short period of time, but it is not to be considered that a
monopoly of all that part of interstate commerce in the City of Chicago
for any one day is any less of a violation of the law than a monopoly
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There does seem to be added significance in the fact that this case
dealt with newspaper competition. 38 As Judge Learned Hand has
pointed out:
However, neither exclusively, nor even primarily, are the interests of
the newspaper industry conclusive; for that industry serves one of the
most vital of all general interests; the dissemination of news from as
many different sources, and with as many different facets and colors as
is possible. That interest is closely akin to, if indeed it is not the
same as, the interest protected by the First Amendment; it pre-supposes
that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude
of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many
this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it for our all. 9
In a time when the dearth of newspaper competition is a matter
of general concern, is not the preservation of temporary competition
highly worthwhile even if permanent competition does not seem
likely? The benefits of competition accrue not only to advertisers,
but also to readers and to those who have issues they desire to bring
to public attention. Most industries are concerned with commodities
or physical services as to which the buyer can find alternative
satisfactory suppliers, but this is much less likely to be true in the
case of ideas, news and space availabilities which different newspapers furnish.
It is apparent from Judge Wyzanski's findings that, despite the
opinion of experts that two papers could not exist in Haverhill,
they had existed for at least two years at the time of judgment, and
there is nothing in the findings to indicate that either was on the
verge of quitting. Was the public to be deprived of their good and
exceptional fortune in having two newspapers because experts believed in the future the hard facts of economic life would overtake
one of these papers? The underlying basis of the test of the effect or
possible effect on competition is the public interest. It would seem
in the public interest to preserve newspaper competition as long as
possible.
IV. UNFAIRiNESS-THE EFFECT OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY SITUATION
The third group of findings by the court relate to the problem of
unfairness, especially with regard to the use of unfair means in a
over the same product and the same market for thirty days or for a year."
Id. at 356.
38. In Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 28 (1945), Justice
Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, said: "But the freedom of enterprise
protected by the Sherman Law necessarily has different aspects in relation
to the press than in the case of ordinary commercial pursuits."
39. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943),
ajfd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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natural monopoly situation. The district court introduced this problem by stating the two-phase approach used by judges to determine
whether a section 2 violation has occurred--"that interpretation of
§ 2 which prohibits a person (a) who has an intent to exclude competition (b) from using not merely technical restraints of trade, but
even predatory practices . . . what may loosely be called unfair

means. ' 40 The court found that the plaintiff had violated section 1
of the Sherman Act by various types of unfair activity; and that by
secret advertising discriminations, both plaintiff and defendant had
also violated section 2. While Judge Wyzanski felt that the "pot"
was considerably blacker than the "kettle," he determined this was
not sufficient to bar the former from succeeding in the action. On
this point the circuit court reversed his holding.
The notable feature of the opinion is the way in which unfair activity in violation of section 1 becomes a double weapon in the hands
of an able judge so that it also serves as prima facie evidence of an
exclusionary intent. The reasoning by which this transmutation takes
place was stated by Judge Wyzanski with his usual clarity:
Contrary to what a layman might suppose, a person does not necessarily
have an exclusionary intent merely because he foresees that a market is
only large enough to permit one successful enterprise, and intends that
his enterprise shall be that one and that all other enterprises shall fail,
If the evidence shows that in laying his plans and executing them he
contemplates and utilizes only superior skill, foresight, and industry,
he has not an intent which is contrary to law. To prove that a person
has that type of exclusionary intent which is condemned in anti-trust
cases there must be evidence that the person who foresees a fight to the
death intends to use or actually does use unfair weapons. Putting the
same idea in another way, we may say that there is no sharp distinction
between (a) the existence of an intent to exclude and (b) the use of
unfair means. In a situation where it is inevitable that only one
competitor can survive, the evidence which shows the use, or contemplated use, of unfair means is the very same evidence which shows the
existence of an exclusionary intent 41
Applied to the present case, this reasoning means that where it is
economically not feasible that two competing newspapers of high
caliber can survive, the use of secret rate discriminations and the
like establishes not only a violation of section 1, but also serves as
evidence of an intent to exclude a competitor by objectionable
methods, so that section 2 is likewise violated. In this manner the

same finding of economic impossibility which the court held prevented the plaintiff's offer to purchase the Gazette from being a
40. 180 F. Supp. at 140. The same approach is indicated in the circuit
court opinion. 284 F.2d at 584-85.
41. 180 F. Supp. at 140.
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section 2 violation served simultaneously as the factor which enabled
the court to find that exclusionary intent necessary to finding a section 2 violation on another basis.
Judge Wyzanski felt that the reasoning we have quoted was
equally applicable to the Gazette's advertising rate discrimination,
and that for this reason the plaintiff should be allowed to recover.
Thus he stated:
[H]aving about fifty per cent of the market, and knowing that the
market would not permit two contestants to survive ... [the Gazette's]
resort to any unfair practice, and its failure to confine itself to exercise
of skill, foresight and industry, compels a conclusion that . . . [the
Gazette] had an exclusionary intent and had attempted to monopolize
the market in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.43
The circuit court, on the other hand, felt that this unduly emphasized
the factor of the "natural monopoly" situation, as indicative of an
exclusionary intent, without giving sufficient weight to the fact that
the Gazette was acting in self-defense. Judge Aldrich felt that by
terming the Gazette's activities "an 'unfair practice' the court assumed the point." He went on to say:
For, as we conceive the issue, the practice was "unfair" if conducted with
an intent to monopolize, but it was fair if it was intended only to resist
deterioration of its own position brought about by Union Leader's unlawful activities.
It is now clear that a plaintiff's own antitrust violations do not bar
its successful maintenance of a private antitrust action.... However, it
does not necessarily follow that a competitor's violations cannot constitute a circumstance to be considered in determining whether the
defendant's conduct was in fact a violation .... We do not think that
the fact that competition is in a natural monopoly climate can limit a
defendant's right to defend itself.m
This modification by the circuit court neutralizes to some extent at
least the effect of the finding of a natural monopoly which was
criticized in the preceding section of this article.
V. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing discussions have indicated, Judge Wyzanski's
decision in the Union Leader case is filled with acute and discerning
observations on the nature of our antitrust laws. At the same time,
it is hoped that this article has pointed out certain unresolved difficulties with the opinion-problems which remain largely unresolved
in the circuit court opinion. The thrust of this criticism is that in
42. 180 F. Supp. at 142-43.
43. 180 F. Supp. at 143.
44. 284 F.2d at 586-87.
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general these opinions apply the concepts of the anti-trust laws too
much in isolation, without giving sufficient consideration to the interrelationships between the parties, and between their activities and

certain public policies.
One must agree with the district court's observation that the mere
fact that one opens a business in an area with the idea that he will
succeed and an existing-perhaps poorly run-business will have to
withdraw and leave him alone in the field is hardly a situation
which the Sherman Act is intended to reach. The Sherman Act does
not protect one from competition, least of all a monopolist, which the
Gazette admittedly was. And this is true even though the competition
is likely to result in a monopoly. 45 But there are limits upon the
methods which one can use to compete, and it seems to the writer
that these limitations cannot be stated wholly in terms of "unfair
means" to the exclusion of such considerations as the use of monopoly
profits.
To equate the reach of the anti-trust laws to the use of "unfair
means" seems much too narrow. It is one thing to find an attempt to
monopolize where "unfair means" are used; it is another thing to
generalize that "unfair means" is the test.46 Is not the dominant or
lack of dominant position of one in the industry to be taken into
45. This does not mean that the public has no interest in the competition
for a natural monopoly. See 284 F.2d at 584 n.4.
To the effect that a so-called "natural monopoly" newspaper is not protected from competition, see Scott Publishing Co. v. Columbia Basin Publishers, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Wash. 1959). This case is a coincidental
counterpart of the Union Leader suit. In the Scott case, the Tri-City Herald,
a daily newspaper, began publishing in a tri-city area in the state of
Washington. The area had a population of about 50,000. It was not a
flourishing success, but by 1949 had a circulation of over 12,000 and was,
except for lack of capital, not in bad shape. Parish, a man with experience
in the newspaper business but who in 1949 was not publishing a newspaper,
decided that the Tri-City area was a promising area for a newspaper. He
first tried to purchase the Tri-City Herald, but negotiations fell through because of lack of agreement as to price. By late 1949, Parish was publishing a
weekly in the area, and by 1950 was publishing a daily, the Columbia Basin
News. There were indications that Parish thought he could eliminate the
competition of the Tri-City Herald.
The Herald was beset by labor troubles starting in December 1949. Over
the years, there was a bitter competitive struggle between the papers which
the Court found rough, but not "dirty." The News lost money steadily and
heavily. It made an attempt to sell out to the Herald which was not successful.
It was succored by the printers' union with which the Herald had never
made its peace. The union gradually became the dominant voice in the
ownership and management of the News. The publisher of the Tri-City
Herald brought suit under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, section 3
of the Clayton Act, and under the Robinson-Patman Act against the publisher of the News. The court gave judgment to the defendant.
46. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106-07 (1948): "[T]hose
things which are condemned by § 2 are in large measure merely the end
products of conduct which violates § 1.... But that is not always true. ...
[Ml onopoly power, whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself
constitute an evil and stand condemned under § 2 even though it remains
unexercised."
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consideration? If one can do this, depending upon superior financial
resources, access to suppliers, and the like, how does this square
with the statement of Judge Learned Hand, speaking of the Aluminum Company of America:
[The company] insists that it never excluded competitors; but we can
think of no more effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each
new opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with new
capacity already geared into a great organization, having the advantage
of experience, trade connection, and the elite of personnel.47
The situation is not, after all, the same when one deals with
newspapers as it is when he deals with cabbages. The anti-trust
laws are not economic postulates, divorced from social considerations
and social values.48 It seems to this writer an egregious error to apply even the most penetrating and exacting logical analysis to cases
like Union Leader without paying great heed to the powerful forces
of society and the unique position of the newspaper in the American
49
way of life.
47. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir.
1945), cited with approval in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328
U.S. 781, 814 (1946). It will hardly do to say that this admonition is concerned only with a single identifiable monopoly. On this theory, a local
monopoly might be parlayed into a national or regional monopoly by
acquisition of a sufficient number of local monopolies. Contiguity or absence
of geographical barriers cannot be an indispensable text. If the Aluminum
Company had a monopoly east of the Rockies, it may be doubted that
Judge Hand would have condoned the acquisition or attempted acquisition of
a monopoly of aluminum west of the Rockies. Each monopoly in the same
field adds to the holder's market power.
48. See Marcus, Antitrust Laws and the Right to Know, 24 IND. L.J. 513
(1949); Marcus, Civil Rights and the Anti-Trust Laws, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 171
(1951).
49. To the effect that Loeb, the publisher of the Journal,was likely to give
Haverhill a type of newspaper different from most newspapers, see LiNDSTROM, THE FADiNG AMERicAN NEWSPAPERS 125 (1960). Said Loeb: "We run
more letters to the editor, I am sure, than any other newspaper in the
nation."

